The downfall of the children of night  Physical and non-physical entities in fifth-century B.C. Greek thought by McKechnie, Paul
THE DOWNFALL OF THE ClllLDREN OF NIGHT 
PHYSICAL AND NON-PHYSICAL ENTITIES IN 
FIFTH-CENTURY B.C. GREEK THOUGHT 
by 
Paul McKechnle 
Tragedy and the Epic Inheritance 
Chaos, says Hesiod in the Theogony, came into being first: 1 and 
Earth next, but unrelated. Earth's children were Heaven, then the 
Titans; gods, then people followed. 2 Chaos' descendants were of a 
different quality. First Erebus (the world of the dead), then Night.3 
Erebus' union with Night produced Aether and Day, then by 
parthenogenesis Night produced: Doom, Fate, Death, Sleep, Dreams. 
Blame, Woe, the Hesperides, Destinies; Clotho, Lachesis and Atropos 
(the three Fates). Retribution, Deceit, Love, Age and Strife.4 
Strife ptoved almost as prolific as Night: Toil, Forgetfulness, Famine, 
Sorrows, Fightings, Battles, Murders, Manslaughters, Quarrels, 
Words, Disputes, Lawlessness, Ruin, Oath.5 
This is a nice tidy archaic aetiology. The author's aim is to explain 
and comment on human experience. Most of the entities are of a 
threatening kind - Love is the chief exception - and their derivation 
from Chaos and Night is very understandable. They are shown as 
gods, but distanced from the familiar anthropomorphic gods by their 
derivation from Chaos instead of Earth. Most of these gods represent 
things which in modem systems of thought are regarded as abstract. 
This paper will argue that when Hesiod wrote (perhaps in the seventh 
century B.C.), and down into the fifth century, these entities - gods 
- were predominantly thought of as physical. in just the same way as 
the Olympian gods were thought of as having bodies, as having 
visited their temples (in the days before the world became too wicked 
for them to come into), as being able to go and visit the blameless 
Ethiopians, 6 and so on. 
In 438 BC Euripides produced the Alcestis. In this play, Death 
(Thanatos, the god of death7) comes on stage and refuses to be 




per&uaded by Apollo not to take Alcestis down to Hades. 8 Later tn the 
play she dies and her body is taken away and burled. But afterwards 
Heracles, feeling he has behaved badly by arrtvtng and enjoying 
himself, by eating and drinking in a house of mourning (Admetushad 
carefully gtven the Impression that the woman who had died was one 
of the servants), goes to the tomb and wrestles with Death, forcing 
him to release Alcestis, who is brought back to the house and 
restored to her husband. 
The audience sees Death only at the beginning of the play, tn the 
scene with Apollo, before any human characters have appeared. The 
death of Alcestis happens on stage, with sorrowing relatives by her 
bed and noreferenceismade tn the scene to thegod Death. 9 But death, 
which tn particular cases is an event, and tngeneralis an abstraction, 
is overcome by Heracles with physical force. Heracles to the Greeks 
was a strongman (hi$ twelve Labours betngtrials ofhis strength), but 
he also features tn this case as a metlfating figure between humans, 
tn the physical world, and gods, whose existence is not viewed as 
purely physical. As a part-human, part-divine person he can wrestle 
with an abstraction - this is the logic of the play: and according to 
Euripides' logic the world of gods is (as tn Hesiod) also the world of 
qualities and abstractions. These things in the gods' world are 
viewed as physically tangible via the physicality of that world 
(Heracles, the demi-god, can wrestle with Death), but aren't thought 
of as 'non-physical' in the normal m<>Qem sense of the term. 
The Dlad and the Odyssey were certainly instrumental in the 
persistence of the view of the world of the gods as also the world of 
qualities and abstractions. They were much the best lmown literary 
works in fifth-centwy Greece. In the Dlacl Patroclus, with his last 
words, warns Hector that Death is standing near him.10 This is easily 
misread as metaphor by a modem reader: but people ahout to die 
were thought of as having an exceptional ability to prophesize and to 
sense the next world: the poet means to communicate that Patroclus 
saw the figure of Death (the same god as in Hesiod: the one brought 
on stage by Euripides) actually standing by Hector. 
And in a wider sense the epic tradition recalled and promoted the 
Hesiodic view of abstractions as gods or shadow-entities whose locus 
of existence was set in the same areas as that of dead souls: when 
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in the first century B.C. Virgil came to develop, drawing on Odyssey 
XI, the Underworld in which Aeneas was to travel, he made the region 
near its gates the home of Mourning, Cares, Diseases, Ag,e, Fear. 
Want, Death, Toil, Sleep, Evil, Joys of the Mind, War, the Furies, 
Discord and Dreams. 11 The split in this list between entities mentioned 
by Hesiod and ones introduced by Virgil is about half and half. Virgil 
was asking a Roman audience six or seven hundred years after 
Hesiod to think in archaic terms (the audience's familiarity with the 
epic tradition would help), but for him the entities were metaphorical 
in a sense in which, to early Greek hearers, Death in Patroclus' dying 
vision had not been. 
On Stage in Comedy 
The epic tradition, then, gave Euripides a background in his audience's 
mind against which he could make Death a god and have Heracles 
wrestling with him. Another figure, or rather figures, from Hesiod's 
lists of the children of Night and Strife, featured on the fifth century 
Athenian stage: Logoi, Words. In Aristophanes Clouds (produced 
in 424 BC) there is a debate scene between two Logoi (one the 'better', 
the other the 'worse'). 12 They argue about whether old-fashioned 
education or modern education is better. In accordance with the 
Greeks' stereotype of sophistical argument, the worse Logos wins. 13 
Comic incongruity derives from two abstractions-made-physical 
bickering over ideas14, and as the Logoi pursue their backbiting 
dialogue, they keep on blurring the distinction between abstract and 
concrete: 
W: But I'm going to beat you, even though you claim to be 
better than me. 
B: So what clever trick are you going to pull off? 
W: I'm going to find some fresh ideas. 
B: Yes ... they burst into flower because of these idiots! 
(indicates audience)15 
Ideas here have become flowers. Latf;r they are scraps of food: 
B: You're doing well for yourself: but I remember when you 
were a beggar ... you kept on saying you were Telephus 




Finally they turn up again as hornets: 
W: ... and If you go on complaining, your whole face and eyes 
are going to end up in tatters, stung to bits by my ideas -
like by homets.17 
Rhetoric and Contracllctlon 
This is clever, surrealistic, and laughable. But the category of 
thought whereby threatening abstract entitles are viewed as gods, 
and as in some sense actually or potentially physical, is still behind 
it. And it persists in an anonymous philosophical text of the tum of 
the fifth/fourth centuries, the Dlssol Logol (='Twofold Words' or 
'Contradictory Words'). This opens: 
Twofold words are spoken in Hellas by the philosophers about 
the good and the bad. For some say that the good is one thing. 
but the bad is another. But others say that it is the same thing, 
and to the same man on one occasion good, on another occasion 
bad.18 
The measure of physicality hinted at in this Js confirmed when the 
writer moves on to another pair of opposites: 
For some say that the nice 19is one thing, but the nasty is another, 
differing, as the word, so also the body (soma). 
Here, whether or not the writer thought of his Logol as children of 
Strife, he clearly speaks of moral qualities (nice, nasty) as bodies: 
things, in some physical or almost-physical sense. 
Some examples of an ethnographical kind follow. In support of the 
relativist position the author proposes that to do your friends good 
is nice, but to do your enemies good is nasty:20 and says that among 
the Thracians tattooing is used as a beauty-treatment for girls, while 
for other peoples tattooes are a punishment for criminals;21 and that 
in Egypt men weave and make wool, while women do business - the 
reverse of the Greek practice. 22 There are other examples too, all 
things which people of one nation think are nice, and people of 
another think are nasty. Then when he comes to stating the case for 
regarding the terms as having an absolute meaning, the author 
produces a very remarkable piece of imagery: 
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But they say that if anyone brought together the nasty things 
from the nations from everywhere, then called out and ordered, 
that anyone should take away the things which he thought nice, 
everything would be taken away as nice. I am surprised that 
nasty things brought together should be nice, and not such as 
they were. If indeed they brought horses or oxen or sheep or 
men, they would take away nothing else . . . Look here, if 
someone brought a nasty man, would he take him away nice?23 
The picture is of a sort of international rubbish-heap. Every ethnic 
group puts on it the practices it considers nasty. Tue Greeks, of 
course, would put doing-good-to-your-enemies on the heap. The 
Egyptians, presumably, would get rid of women-making-wool in the 
same way. Then it is announced that anyone who sees something 
nice on this heap can take it away. The Greeks would be happy with 
women-making-wool, and in fact, for every possible custom, there 
would be someone who thought it was all right. 
The reader (or hearer) is being .asked to think of abstract ideas as if 
they were concrete things which you could dump, or carry away with 
you. The objection offered at the end is that a nasty man (the analogy 
drawn with a nasty practice is direct, even if fallacious) will be just 
as nasty when carried away as when dumped. It might be going too 
far to say that the writer thought abstract things were really another 
sort of concrete things, but it is obvious at least that he does not 
recognise the difference in attributes between an abstract thing and 
a concrete thing which modem people are usually conscious of. 
Empedocles and Anaxagoras: Love, Strife and Mind 
This view of abstractions as not being different in kind from physical 
objects, together with the tendency evident in the Alcestis and the 
Clouds for the representation of abstractions as gods to be acceptable 
to play audiences, goes some way towards explaining the outlook of 
the philosopher Empedocles. Rather than being what we might now 
regard as a rationalist, Empedocles (working about the middle of the 
fifth century) offered a cosmology which was in effect a 
remythologization of ideas of the origins of the world and the human 
race that were familiar from Hesiod and other traditional stories. He 
viewed the universe as a system which oscillated between being 'one' 
and being 'many' ,?.4 and suggested that it was the mutually opposed 
influences of Love and Strife which caused this oscillation. 
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Love and Strife, which a modem reader would instinctively react to 
as if they were abstract principles explaining observed effects, were 
apparently viewed by Empedocles in a quite straight forward fashion 
as gods. Love, in Hesiod a child of Night, Empedocles identifies with 
Aphrodite, whom he thinks of as the first deity worshipped by human 
beings:25 and Strife he speaks of as having limbs. 28 His 
remythologlzation of prehistory offered a scheme in which the 
functions of the divine actors were perhaps more easily analysed in 
aetiological temlS than in the traditional scheme. Certainly by 
Plato's time, a generation or so after Empedocles, the inscrutable 
motives. or downright immorality, of the gods was provoking 
objections. 27 At any rate Empedocles' scheme involved a balance of 
forces - an idea useful in view of his preoccupation with the issue of 
'one' and 'many'. But principles took shape in his mind in personal 
terms as g9C1s. Unlike Euripides and Aristophanes, Empedocles was 
not concerned with the personalities and effects which could be 
brought on stage: but all three authors, in different contexts, 
exemplify how reification of abstract concepts involved also their 
deification: a thing which was not physical or inanimate would be 
treated as divine. 
But a shift away from this view did take place. It was neither quick 
nor, in a sense, complete. It began in the same generation in which 
Empedocles and Euripides were working, and there is some reason 
to think that the writer of the Dlssoi Logoi was a rather old fashioned 
voice a generation later when his nice and nasty things were given 
their physical quality in his argument. 
Anaxagoras, an older contemporary of Empedocles, whose 
philosophical work was apparently done later than the younger 
man's, 28 took a different direction in his thinking. It may be 
significant that he was a prose author. while Empedocles was a poet: 
this may indicate alignment with ·the sophistic style of thought and 
speculation which was gaining ground at this period, since the 
sophists made theirincomefromgtvinginstructionin public speaking 
(hence in prose writing). Anaxagoras was interested in deductions 
from observation, and his overall theory involved Mind being the 
controlling entity in the universe: everything else was a mixture, but 
Mind, Anaxagoras thought, was pure and unmixed: 
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All other things have a portion of everything, but Mind is infinite 
and self-ruled, and is mixed with nothing but is all alone by 
itself. For if it was not by itself, but was mixed with anything else 
... the things that were mingled with it would hinder it so that 
1t could control nothing . . . For 1t is the finest of all things and 
the purest, it has all knowledge about everything and the 
greatest power: and Mind controls all things, both the greater 
and the smaller quantities of it, while nothing else is like 
anything else, but each single body is and was most plainly 
those things of which it contains most. 29 
This is not quite a description of an abstract entity: it is 'fine' and 
'pure' and there are 'quantities' of it. 30 But there are two important 
elements which suggest that he has thought things out on different 
lines from Empedocles. First. he has produced a sort of criterion of 
physicality: the idea of 'a portion of everything in everything' may 
have its difficult aspects - but as a way of defining a physical thing, 
as distinct from an abstraction, it has something to recommend it. 
Second, he has got away from the children of Night. His work is not 
a selective reinterpretation of the myths recorded in the Theogony. 
Mind may not be a fully abstract entity in Anaxagoras' system, but 
it is also not a god. 
Socrates and Plato: the Birth of Idealism 
ReadingAnaxagor.as' book, Socrates was not satisfied with the place 
which Mind was assigned in the way the physical world worked. 31 He 
felt Anaxagoras gave physical causes for phenomena without facing 
the question why it was best that things should be as they were - and 
the world's beingthe best possible, Socrates thought, was implicit in 
Anaxagoras' assertion that it was controlled by Mind. But all the 
same, the progress towards conceiving and defining an abstract 
entity which is in evidence inAnaxagoras' work was a prerequisite for 
theSocratlc/Platonicviewofwhatanon-physical thingwas. Socrates' 
insistence on being given the definition of a quality 'by itself32, as 
distinct from instances exemplifying it, reflects and perhaps draws 
on Anaxagoras' idea of Mind existing 'all alone by itself. 
Consider the soul. In the Odyssey, souls of the dead are shades -
strengthlessversions of the physical bodies of the deceased. Odysseus 
can even keep them away from the blood of the sacrifice with a 
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sword. 33 By drinking the sacrificial blood, a soul becomes more 
physical - more like a living person:34 able to talk and think. which 
a ghost is envisaged as being unable to do. In the Pbaedo, though. 
the soul is treated as non-physical. Socrates treats with jocular 
contempt the idea that the soul, on leaving the body at death, might 
get. scattered by the wtnd;315 and earlier in the dialogue he has laid 
stress on the need for the soul to escape from all physical contacts 
and associa.tions in order to seek reality.38 The antithesis between 
body (as physical) and soul (as non-physical) 1$ very strong here: the 
soul is not treated as ,iaost but as something which has its existence 
in a completely non-physiCal realm. There is a description of the 
afterlife at the end of the dialogue where the next world ts described 
in physical terms: but it is referred to as a 'tale' (muthos) and its 
function ts to deal with how the soul goes away from the visible 
world:37 the distinction between physical and non-physical worlds is 
well understood and well marked in the dialogue, and the apparently 
only half-conscious shift from abstract to concrete in theDlsaol Loeol 
seems a long way away. 
To conclude, there are categ~ry words which we would normally 
regard as abstract nouns denoting events (e.g. death), feelings (e.g. 
love) or qualities (e.g. lawlessness). They can be used quite unself-
consciously, and presumably usually were in Archaic and early 
Classical Greece. But when someone wonders 'what is X? (where x 
is death, or love, or lawlessness), a challenge to understanding 
arises. The picture built up in Hesiod, particularly by the lists of the 
children of Night and Strife, suggest that in the Archaic mind the 
answer to 'what is X?' was, 'a god.' The Dlad bears this out, and the 
same answer could be assumed in the fifth century by Euripides and 
Aristophanes and Empedocles. 
The current of fifth-century thought involving Anaxagoras and 
Socrates moved away from this view of abstractions, though the 
tendency to envisage abstractions in a physical way persisted at least 
as late as the date of the Dlssol Loeol. As this tendency slipped into 
the past, Plato developed an idealist system whereby objects in this 
world were understood to correspond to, or be derived from, Forms 
existing in a non-physical, intell1gible world. A sort of reversal took 
place: Plato's Socrates thinks of this world and the things inttas less 
real than the non-physical world;38 whereas earlier the standard of 
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reality had been the physical world, and things which were not 
physical had been understood as belonging to the world of the gods 
or (as in the case of ghosts) as being only partially real. 
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